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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST-
CONTEMPT BY RADIO.-In Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. et al. v.
Maryland' appellants were adjudged not guilty of contempt of
court for broadcasting over local radio stations, with state wide
coverage, certain news dispatches obtained from a police com-
missioner concerning a murder charge against Eugene H. James,
a Negro, who was then in custody of the police pending trial.
James had been charged with the murder of an eleven year old
girl at a time when the public was aroused due to a series of
assaults in Baltimore and Washington, D. C. At his trial a jury
was waived because counsel felt that
... inasmuch as it was common knowledge throughout the
city that James had, allegedly, made a confession, and that
he had been previously convicted for crimes somewhat simi-
lar to his then present indictment... [counsel felt that he]
could not have picked a jury that had not been infected, so
to speak, by the knowledge of this man's confession and his
criminal background. 2
James pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,
but the trial court found him guilty. The decision was affirmed
on appeal.3
While James was awaiting trial, the appellant radio station
made a number of broadcasts in which it identified James by
name, age, color, and address, which address, as was carefully
pointed out, was near the scene of the crime. The broadcasts
stated that James had confessed to this crime and also to a pre-
vious assault on a white woman, and that he had previously
served time for attacking a ten-year-old girl. A typical excerpt
from one of the broadcasts is
... this morning, according to the officers, James admitted
an attack on a white woman recently in the same woods near
where the Brill girl was slain. In that case, too, James used
a knife but only to threaten his victim into submission...
With more information supplied by James, police recovered
the woman's pocketbook, which had been taken from her
.... James is not an obivous mental case. Throughout all
1. 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
2. Id- at 504.
3. James v. State, 65 A.2d 888 (Md. 1949).
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this questioning, said the police, he seemed, as they put it,
"quite cute," in other words, wary. When James freely ad-
mitted the assault on the woman the police were encouraged
and renewed their interrogation with renewed vigor. They
felt that James had admitted the lesser assault only to throw
the police off the main track, and they felt they were close to
a confession in the Brill Case. They were in fact.4
This and similar broadcasts constituted the basis of the con-
tempt charge in that these broadcasts tended to influence any
jury that might have been chosen upon James' trial thus inter-
fering with a fair administration of justice.
The Maryland Court of Appeals found that the radio station's
conduct did not constitute a clear and present danger to the
orderly and fair administration of justice, basing the decision onl
the ground that the court "cannot assume as a matter of law ...
that either judges or jurors will be influenced by considerations
which under their official oaths they are bound to disregard. '"
The court went on to say that the same test for constructive
contempt-clear and present danger-is to be applied in cases in
which jurors are involved, such as the present one, as is applied
in cases dealing with judges. Judges are not so "angelic" as to
render them immune from influences calculated to affect others;
and, conversely, juries are often composed of citizens who are
capable of the same firmness and impartiality as the judiciary.
In brief, the court held that despite great public fervor and
indignation as a result of several so-called sex crimes in and near
the city of Baltimore, the publishing of inflammatory words
does not present a clear and present danger to the orderly and
fair administration of a trial involving a Negro charged with
the murder of a white child in a Southern state.
Contempts of court are of two kinds: those committed in the
very presence of the court which tend to embarrass or prevent
justice, termed direct, and constructive contempts; those com-
mitted out of the view of the court which tend to belittle, de-
grade, obstruct or prevent justice.6 For many years it has been
said that courts possess the inherent power to punish for con-
4. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. et al. v. Maryland, 67 A.2d 497, 501 (Md.
1949).
5. Id. at 510.
6. BouviER, LAW DICTIONARY 651 (3d Revision) 1914.
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tempt those persons who are not connected with the trial, but
who disturb its proceedings.7
Nelles and King, in their article, "Contempt by Publication in
the United States," list the following formula as being the
basis of the decisions in the State cases sustaining punishment
for publications:
The inherent power of the court, arising from its necessity
of maintaining itself as an efficient agency for the adminis-
tration of justice, and sanctioned by immemorial usage, ex-
tends to the infliction of summary punishment
(1) for a publication respecting a court, or a judge in hisjudicial capacity, calculated to bring its or his administra-
tion of justice into disrepute (scandalizing the court) ;
or (2) for a publication which may obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice "in a pending cause." 8
At the present time there seems to be some doubt as to whether
the courts do have this inherent power to punish for contempt.
This is pointed out in Bridges v. California,9 the leading case
dealing with constructive contempt which is embraced in the
principal case. The Bridges case arose over a series of articles
published by the Los Angeles Times which recommended certain
punishment for a group of labor hoodlums who had been found
guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and were awaiting sen-
tence. The editorials threatened the judge with future adverse
criticism from the Times should the judge fail to give the sen-
tence that it thought proper. The paper was found to be in con-
tempt of court by the state supreme court which decision was re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court.
The issue in the Bridges case was whether the publications
involved created "such likelihood of bringing about the substan-
tive evil [disorderly and unfair administration of justice] as to
deprive [the paper] of the constitutional protection [freedom of
the press] ?" This, of course, raises the further question of de-
limiting the term "likelihood."
7. Deutsch, Liberty of Expression and Contempt of Court, 27 MINN. L.
REv. 296 (1943).
8. 28 CoL. R. REv. 525, 537 (1928).
9. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). The scope of this comment does not include the
history of contempt, but merely deals with the decisions involving contempt
of court since the Bridges case. For history concerning the power of courts
to punish for contempt in summary fashion see Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT
c.II; Deutsch, Liberty of Expression and Contempt of Court, 27 MINN. L.
Rzv. 296 (1943).
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* The decision in the Bridges case is based on language used by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United Stateso wherein he
stated:
... in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said... would have been within their
constitutional rights. But the character of every act de-
pends upon the circumstances in which it is done... The
question in every case is whether the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent .... It is a
question of proximity and degree.1'
The court, in the Bridges case, goes on to say that,
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger"
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished.1
It is then pointed out that the topic involved is one of public
interest and one that should receive the benefit of full and com-
plete discussion if it is to be settled satisfactorily. As the utter-
ances were made during the pendency of the case, holding the
appellant guilty of contempt would be restricting its utterances
at the precise time when they are most needed. It would remove
controversies that command the most interest from the "arena
of public discussion" so that, if the curtailment of expression can
be "justified at all, it must be in terms of some serious substan-
tive evil which they are designed to avert"-disorderly and un-
fair administration of justice.13
The court concluded that the editorials were not such as
amount to a "substantial influence upon the course of justice,"
as a contrary holding "would be to impute to judges a lack of
firmness, wisdom, or honor, which we [the court] cannot accept
as a major premise."
The case was decided by a 5-4 vote, a strong dissent by Mr.
10. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
11. Id. at 52. Defendant sent circulars through the mail saying that the
draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution and, although
not expressly urging draftees to resist the draft, its implied meaning, as
found by the Court, was to urge persons subject to the draft to obstruct
the carrying out of same.
12. 314 U. S. 222, 263 (1941).
13. Ibid. The Court expressly says that a newspaper may not be sum-
marily punished for showing. disrespect for the bench, for Americans have
always been able to criticize public institutions.
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Justice Frankfurter pointing out that, although the majority
does not say in so many words that trial by newspaper has con-
stitutional sanctity, "the atmosphere of their opinions and sev-
eral of its phrases" infer that it does. The clear and present dan-
ger rule is one of "proximity and degree" and can only be applied
correctly by the exercise of good judgment.
The majority in the Bridges case is thus saying that the "in-
herent" or "reasonable tendency test," as used in Toledo News
Co. v. U. S.1' and by the California Supreme Court,15 of a publi-
cation to cause disrespect for the judiciary or interference with
the orderly administration of justice in a pending case, is not
sufficient to establish punishable contempt, but that the publica-
tion must amount to something more - a clear and present
danger to the orderly and fair administration of justice.
A case illustrating the difference between the "reasonable ten-
dency" rule and the stricter "clear and present danger" rule is
Graham v. Jones, G which involved comments by a newspaper
proposing a decision for a case, then before the Supreme Court
of Louisiana, dealing with a reorganization program passed by
the state legislature. The court found that the editorials were
designed to influence the court's decision by means of a culti-
vated public clamor. In fact the newspaper was unable so to in-
fluence the court; but while a motion for a rehearing was pend-
ing, the newspaper published numerous articles describing how
the Legislature and the Governor were ready to take every step
possible to repair the damage done by the invalidation of the
Reorganization program by the supreme court. The articles
named the judges responsible for the decision and intimated that
they were responsible for the fall of an amendment designed to
do away with corrupt government, thus inferring to the public
that the Supreme Court of Louisiana could have reached a con-
trary decision had it so desired.
The court points out that the language used by the newspaper
goes far beyond a fair and reasonable criticism of the decision
in the Reorganization case. It goes on to say that constructive
criticism is helpful in the due administration of the law, but a
publication ridiculing the court's decision and creating an atmos-
14. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
15. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d (1940).
16. 200 La. 137, 7 So.2d 688 (1942).
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phere of disapproval in the public's mind is not such criticism
as will aid the court to rectify error. In view of the fact that
there was extensive publicity given the pending suit, involving
the validity of a-constitutional amendment providing for a dras-
tic change in the form of government and that the paper enjoyed
a large circulation throughout the state, "it can not be disputed
that the editorials tended materially to affect the orderly admin-
istration of justice in the proceeding to which they refer. .. "
Such being the effect of the editorials, publishing them amounts
to contempt of court under the "reasonable tendency" rule, but
due to the Bridges case repudiating this rule and overruling, in
effect, the "jurisprudence refusing to extend the constitutional
protection of liberty of the press and freedom of speech to the
offenders as their contemptuous acts deserved" the newspaper
was found not to be in contempt of court.
The principal case cites a 1946 United States Supreme Court
decision, Pennekamp v. Florida,1 7 as supporting its argument
that the published utterances of the appellant radio station do
not amount to a clear and present danger to the fair and orderly
administration of justice. The Pennekazmp case adds little to the
standard set by the Bridges' case. The Pennekamp case concerns
editorials and a cartoon which
• . . caricatured a court by a robed compliant figure as a
judge on the bench tossing aside formal charges to hand a
document, marked "Defendant dismissed," to a powerful
figure close at his left arm and of an intentionally drawn
criminal type. At the right of the bench, a futile individual
labeled "Public Interest" vainly protests. 8
The editorials and cartoon were in reference to the handling of
several rape cases by the court. As found by the court, the edi-
torials contained only "half truths" and did not "fairly report
the proceedings."
The case is merely a restatement of what the court had previ-
ously said in the Bridges case. The facts in this case are such
that even Mr. Justice Frankfurter, an advocate of the reasonable
tendency test, found that they did not "tend to influence or at-
tempt to influence the court."' 9 Also to be noted in this case is
the fact that there is a difference of opinion among the majority
17. 328 U.S. 331 (1945).
18. Id. at 337.
19. Id. at 367.
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as to whether or not the "rape" cases were pending when the
editorials were published because if they were not pending there
is no punishable contempt by the very definition of the word.
As the principal case assumes that the standard to be applied
to juries, in determinnig whether there is a clear and present
danger to the orderly and fair administration of justice, is the
same as applied to judges, it relies on the United States Supreme
Court's most recent decision, Craig v. Harney, 20 wherein a news-
paper was found guilty of constructive contempt by the state
court when it (newspaper) commented on a forcible detainer
case, Jackson v. Mayes,21 in which Jackson sought to regain pos-
session of a business building which Mayes (who was in the
armed forces at the time and was represented by an agent)
claimed under a lease, to further show the application of this
standard. The articles called the ruling in the Jackson case an
"arbitrary action and a travesty on justice." They criticized the
fact that the judge was a layman. The articles stated that the
opinion was a "gross miscarriage of justice" and that the
judge's behavior had properly brought the "wrath of public
opinion upon his head," that the defendant was getting a raw
deal and that justice had not been done in that both sides did
not get a fair opportunity to be heard. These comments appeared
in the various papers while a decision was pending upon a
motion for a new trial.
The United States Supreme Court, holding that the editorials
did not amount to a contempt, thus reversing the state court,
repeats the doctrine found in all of its decisions under the clear
and present danger rule.
A judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures to
publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to
belittle him.... The vehemence of the language used is not
alone the measure of the power to punish him for contempt.
The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The
danger must not be remote or even probable; it must im-
mediately imperil.22
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, says that "today's de-
cision, in effect though not in terms, holds unconstitutional a
20. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
21. Unreported Texas decision.
22. Id. at 376.
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power the possession of which by the States this Court has here-
tofore deemed axiomatic. 23 If the Court intends to put an end
to the power of States to allow summary proceedings for con-
structive contempt, and to allow the power only in those casls
which actually interfere with the trial, then the court should
say so instead of agreeing with a "principle in principle only
to depart from it in practice."
In the preceding cases there are several points which are com-
mon to all. The Bridges case states flatly that a newspaper may
not be summarily punished for scandalizing a court as there is
no substantive evil involved which will warrant curtailment of
freedom of the press. But the court states that such punishment
is proper if there is a clear and present danger to the orderly
and fair administration of justice, it being a substantive evil
which will warrant the court in curtailing the freedom of press.
This principle has been followed in the other cases by the United
States Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the comments by the various newspapers
touched upon subjects that were of vital public interest. The
Bridges case involved a labor controversy which was of general
interest, particularly in that it dealt with a threatened general
strike on the West coast. This was a subject which demanded
for its satisfactory solution intelligent comments and free dis-
cussion. It affected the every day lives of the people. The
Pennekaomp and Craig cases pertained to the handling of cases
by the state courts. In the Pennekamp case the comments
went to the administration of criminal justice, while the com-
ments in the Craig case, although arousing public sympathy
toward the serviceman who was involved, also criticized the
court system which allowed a layman to sit as judge and
which had no provision for appeal. Though the criticisms of
the courts were published while the two cases were pending,
the comments were of a general nature, going to the court
system as a whole and not interfering with the orderly and
fair administration of justice. The articles concerned subjects
of public interest; and an independent judiciary necessitates
freedom of the press. The Graham case also involved a subject
of public interest-legislative anactments. Although the news-
paper did not present the subject in -the best taste, the articles
23. Id. at 384.
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were necessary in order to arouse public interest so that a con-
stitutional amendment might be passed putting into effect the
reforms sought by the Reorganization program which was de-
clared to be unconstitutional.
Thus it is seen that these editorials were of public interest,
affecting the community as a whole. They dealt with subjects
which depend, for their final and agreeable settlement, upon the
active interest of the public therein. They involved topics which
newspapers are under an obligation to present to the public.
The principal case, which involved attacks on children, was of
interest to the public; but this interest should be limited to the
apprehension of the offender and to future protection of the
children from attacks of this sort. The area of public discussion
does not, and should not, include the comments which were made
by the broadcasting company which recited James' alleged prior
offenses and previous convictions. These were not broadcasted
in the interest of good news-broadcasting, but merely in an at-
tempt to hold the listener to the station. This was used as a de-
vice to obtain listeners at the cost of James' right to a fair trial
with an impartial jury.
Does the United States Supreme Court mean to apply the same
standard to juries as it applies to judges? As pointed out in the
dissent to the principal case, the majority seems to reject the
United States Supreme Court doctrine, and adopt the minority
view, as to the relation of judges to publications in that the
majority says that "judges are not so 'angelic' as to render them
immune to human influences calculated to affect the rest of man-
kind." While this is probably the more realistic view, it is not
in harmony with the United States Supreme Court decisions
which are based upon the premise that judges are gifted with
such firmness, wisdom, and honor that they are able to with-
stand the most relentless and contemptuous of attacks.
As a result of using the minority view, the court in the princi-
pal case arrives at the conclusion that the United States Supreme
Court did not mean to differentiate between the standard applied
to judges and the standard to be applied to juries. This conclu-
sion is purely conjectural because there are no decided cases,
since the Bridges case, which deal with juries. It would seem, in
view of the language used in the decisions by the United States
Supreme Court, that this reasoning by the majority in the prin-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cipal case is fallacious in that, as pointed out previously, the
Court imputes a greater amount of firmness to a judge than can
be expected to be found in the average juror.
The majority in the principal case suggests that a juror who
is prejudiced so as not to be fit for jury duty may be discovered
during his voir dire, but assuming that the juror answers truth-
fully that he is not prejudiced, can it be said that he is entirely
unaffected by what he has heard and read prior to his selection
as a juror?
It is suggested that the simplest and surest method of obtain-
ing a lack of bias or prejudice on the part of a juror is by
limiting the opinions of others that are expressed through the
medium of radio and newspaper.
On January 9, 1950, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari to petitioner seeking review of Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc. et al. v. Maryland.24 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
an opinion dealing with the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari in which he points out that this denial means simply
that fewer than four members of the court "deemed it desirable
to review a decision of the lower court as a matter 'of sound
judicial discretion.'" It in no way means that "either the major-
ity or the dissent in the court below correctly interpreted the
scope of our decisions in Bridges v. California, Pennekamp v.
Florida, and Craig v. Harney." At the end of his opinion, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, sets forth recent English decisions "dealing
with situations in which publications were claimed to have in-
juriously affected the prosecutions for crime awaiting jury
determination" and then points out that this has not yet been
adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court.
The English courts use the "reasonable tendency" test, but
there is no reason why the same result could not be obtained in
the United States under the "clear and present danger" test as
both tests are merely phrases used to describe a situation that
will affect the orderly and fair administration of justice. There
is no definition for "clear and present danger"-it is a question
of proximity and degree.
Somewhat of a standard has been set by court adjudications
but they apply to judges only. Using the United States Supreme
Court's premise that judges are a hardy lot and should be able
24. 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
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to survive in a hard climate, does it necessarily follow that the
same standard should apply to jurors? It would seem that there
would be a clear and present danger to the substantive evil of a
disorderly and unfair administration of justice in that jurors
may be biased by what they have heard and read outside of the
court room long before a judge would be, unless the same premise
is to be applied to jurors.
WALTER J. TAYLOR, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL UNDER EMER-
GENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT. In United States v. Jepson" the gov-
ernment brought an action under the Emergency Price Control
Act of 19422 to recover treble damages for rent overcharges. The
defendant moved for a jury trial, claiming that his right fell
within the guarantee of the Seventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Held, this action for a penalty under statute
conforms to the requisites of the common law action of debt and
trial by jury should be upheld.
In speaking of penalties under a civil statute, Blackstone was
of the opinion that the action of debt arose from the obligations
imposed on each citizen by the original social contract. When
that contract was broken, the legislature prescribed a sum cer-
tain as a penalty which then became due and owing as a debt.3
In the instant case it is the statute that supplies the causa de-
bendi and stipulates that a certain or ascertainable sum is due
and owing to specified persons when the specified acts are done.4
Thus, all the requisites of the action of debt are fulfilled when
the obligation to pay and the certainey of the amount due arise
from the operation of the statute.
The right to trial by jury in a civil case originates in the
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution which states:
In suits at common law where the value of the controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved. 5
1. 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.C.N.J. 1950). The opinion is that of the district
court judge in response to defendant's motion for a jury trial.
2. Presumably under § 205e of 56 STAT. 23, 50 U.S.C. § 205e (1946) as
amended 50 U.S.C.A. § 925e (Supp. 1950).
3. 3 BL. COMM. 161.
4. KEIGWIN, CASES IN COMMON LAW PLEADING, 34 (2d ed. 1934).
5. U.S. CONsT. AMEND. VH.
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